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Quantum key distribution (QKD) exploits the quan-
tum nature of light to share provably secure keys, allow-
ing secure communication in the presence of an eaves-
dropper. The first QKD schemes used photons en-
coded in two states, such as polarization [1, 2]. Re-
cently, much effort has turned to large-alphabet QKD
schemes, which encode photons in high-dimensional ba-
sis states [3–11]. Compared to binary-encoded QKD,
large-alphabet schemes can encode more secure informa-
tion per detected photon, boosting secure communication
rates, and also provide increased resilience to noise and
loss [12]. High-dimensional encoding may also improve
the efficiency of other quantum information processing
tasks, such as performing Bell tests [13] and implement-
ing quantum gates [14]. Here, we demonstrate a large-
alphabet QKD protocol based on high-dimensional tem-
poral encoding. We achieve record secret-key rates and
perform the first field demonstration of large-alphabet
QKD. This demonstrates a new, practical way to opti-
mize secret-key rates and marks an important step to-
wards transmission of high-dimensional quantum states
in deployed networks.
High-dimensional encoding is possible in a variety
of degrees of freedom, and large-alphabet QKD has
been demonstrated in the laboratory using position-
momentum [4], time-energy [5–9], and orbital angular
momentum modes [10, 11]. Of these, time-energy en-
coding is appealing for its compatibility with existing
telecommunications infrastructure — which lowers the
barriers to widespread adoption of QKD. The time-
energy correlations are robust over transmission in both
fiber and free-space channels and are preserved when
passing through wavelength-division multiplexing. In
high-dimensional temporal encoding, the position of a
photon within a symbol frame comprising M time slots
can convey as much as log2M bits of information, as de-
picted in Figure 1(a). Classically, this encoding is known
as pulse position modulation (PPM), and combined with
single-photon detection, it achieves near-optimal perfor-
mance in terms of bits per detected photon [15]. Assum-
ing a constant slot duration, PPM exhibits a trade-off
between the alphabet size M and the transmitted sym-
bol rate: an increase in the former directly corresponds
to a decrease in the latter. The alphabet size determines
how much information is encoded in each photon, and the
transmitted symbol rate directly affects how many pho-
tons are received per second. We take advantage of this
trade-off to maximize the secret-key rate in the presence
of detector saturation.
Figure 1(b) is a representative plot of secret-key rate
versus channel length for binary encoding with realizable
parameters. Three regimes of distance/loss are indicated.
In normal operation (Region II), the secret-key rate de-
creases exponentially with distance until the received
photon flux is comparable to the background counts of
the detector(s). At distances/losses beyond this cutoff
point (Region III), the correlations between sender and
receiver are masked by the background and the secret-
key rate drops abruptly. However, at short distances,
i.e., low losses (Region I), the secret-key rate is limited
when the received photon flux saturates the detectors,
as illustrated in Figure 1(b). In this regime, which ex-
tends to approximately 100 km for these parameters, the
best strategy to maximize the secret-key rate is to re-
duce the transmitted photon rate by increasing the al-
phabet size until the detectors are just below saturation.
Although much research has focused on extending the
range of QKD links well beyond 100 km [16–18], deployed
QKD networks will include a variety of link lengths with
potentially different optimal technologies, and thus we
focus here on using high-dimensional encoding to maxi-
mize secret-key rates over metropolitan-area distances of
tens of kilometers.
To demonstrate high-rate, large-alphabet QKD, we
implemented dispersive-optics QKD (DO-QKD) [19], a
high-dimensional QKD protocol based on time-energy
encoding, with the basis transformations produced by
group velocity dispersion (GVD). We previously proved
the security of this scheme against arbitrary collective at-
tacks [19] and implemented the scheme using entangled
photon pairs in the laboratory [8]. The present work is a
prepare-and-measure (P&M) version of DO-QKD, with
decoy-state protection against photon number splitting
attacks [20–22].
In P&M DO-QKD, as pictured in Figure 2, the trans-
mitter, Alice, filters a broadband light source to ∼ 25
GHz centered around 1559 nm and uses an electro-optic
modulator to encode a PPM sequence that will become
the raw key. To prepare in the time basis, Alice sends
the PPM pulse to the receiver, Bob, and to prepare in
the energy basis, she applies normal GVD with magni-
tude 10,000 ps/nm to the pulse before sending it to Bob.
The basis choice must be random to an eavesdropper,
Eve, but known to Alice. Before transmitting, Alice at-
tenuates the pulses to keep the average number of pho-
tons less than one per pulse, but she varies the intensity
between signal states, which are used for generating se-
cure keys, and weaker decoy states, which are used for
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FIG. 1. (a) In high-dimensional temporal encoding (pulse position modulation), information is encoded in the position of an
optical pulse within M slots, depicted here for alphabet size M ∈ {2, 4, 8, 16}. For a fixed slot duration, the alphabet size and
the transmitted pulse rate are inversely proportional. (b) Representative plot of secret-key rate versus channel length for a
traditional two-dimensional QKD protocol, assuming a 5 Gbps modulation rate, a 0.2 dB/km channel loss, a 1 kcps background
count rate, a 93% detector efficiency, and a 100 ns detector reset time after each detection event. Three regions are denoted:
I. At short distances, 0-100 km (or correspondingly, low losses, 0-20 dB), the secret-key rate is limited by detector saturation.
II. For higher losses (normal operation), the secret-key rate decays exponentially with distance. III. At even higher losses (>
300 km), a cutoff is reached when Bob’s received photon rate becomes comparable to his detectors’ background count rate.
The error rate grows and the secret-key rate drops abruptly.
channel monitoring to guard against a photon-number-
splitting attack. Alice also precompensates for the GVD
incurred over the fiber channel, or the security of the
protocol would be degraded. On a separate channel (not
pictured in Figure 2), Alice sends a periodic strong op-
tical pulse that Bob detects with a photodiode and uses
as a timing reference. To measure in the time basis, Bob
detects the photon arrival time, and to measure in the
energy basis, he applies anomalous GVD with magni-
tude 10,000 ps/nm to the photon before detecting the
arrival time. Bob’s single-photon detectors are niobium
nitride (NbN) SNSPDs capable of counting at hundreds
of Mcps rates, with 68% detection efficiency, timing res-
olution of tens of picoseconds, and few kcps dark count
rates [23]. A single optical fiber is coupled to four in-
terleaved nanowires, which are read out by a commer-
cial time-to-digital converter (Picoquant Hydraharp 400)
with a 80 ns dead time per channel. Information can be
shared when Alice and Bob both apply GVD or both do
not apply GVD. When only one party applies GVD, the
correlation between prepared pulse time and measured
pulse time is degraded from tens of picoseconds (limited
by the detector timing resolution) to nanoseconds (de-
termined by the optical bandwidth and the magnitude
of the GVD). Alice and Bob convert the photon tim-
ing correlations into shared secret keys through a series
of classical postprocessing steps. Bob demodulates the
PPM signal, and Alice and Bob sift their data to postse-
lect symbols encoded and decoded using the same basis.
They correct errors between their symbol strings using
a multi-layer low-density parity-check (LDPC) code [24],
and they perform privacy amplification to eliminate Eve’s
information about their shared error-free symbol strings.
The secure photon information efficiency (PIE) quan-
tifies Alice and Bob’s information advantage over Eve,
who can mount arbitrary collective attacks. By mea-
suring the covariance matrix associated with the corre-
lation between prepared pulse time and measured pulse
time [19, 25] and by monitoring the fraction of detec-
tion events originating from single-photon emission with
weak-intensity decoy states [20–22], Alice and Bob can
bound the information accessible to Eve. Any informa-
tion that Alice and Bob share in excess of this bound will
be secure, except with a finite failure probability that
corresponds to the predetermined security parameter εs
[26–29].
We tested the system, varying the PPM alphabet size
M ∈ {4, 8, 16, 32}, in three scenarios: in the laboratory
in the back-to-back configuration with negligible channel
loss, in the laboratory using a 41-km spool of standard
single-mode fiber, and in a field test over a 43-km de-
ployed fiber. The deployed-fiber testbed comprised a pair
of dark fibers running between the main campus of MIT
in Cambridge, MA, and MIT Lincoln Laboratory in Lex-
ington, MA, as illustrated in Figure 2. Installed fibers are
subject to environmental perturbations, such as temper-
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FIG. 2. Map showing node locations and approximate path of the installed 43-km deployed-fiber testbed used in this work.
Overlaid are Alice’s transmitter, located in Cambridge, MA, and Bob’s receiver, located in Lexington, MA. BPF: bandpass
filter. EOM: electro-optic modulator. VOA: variable attenuator. ND: normal GVD. AD: anomalous GVD. DCF: dispersion-
compensating fiber.
ature fluctuations, that are not present in the laboratory,
as well as higher losses due to greater numbers of splices
and bends. The 41-km fiber spool had a total loss of 7.6
dB, but the loss over the deployed fiber was 12.7 dB —
equivalent to 63.5 km of standard single-mode fiber on a
spool (assuming standard loss of 0.2 dB/km).
In the back-to-back configuration, we observed a max-
imum secret-key rate of 23 Mbps with M = 16. Over
the 41-km fiber spool, the maximum secret-key rate
was 5.3 Mbps with M = 8. Over the 43-km deployed
fiber, the maximum secret-key rate was 1.2 Mbps with
M = 4. Table I summarizes the three test cases, and Fig-
ure 3(a) plots the experimental results along with theo-
retical secret-key rates as functions of channel loss. The
reported values and theoretical curves include decoy state
and finite-key analysis with sample size N = 109 counts
and security parameter εs = 10
−10 [28, 29]. Colors cor-
respond to alphabet size and thus to test configuration,
since each configuration had a different optimal alpha-
bet size. The theoretical curves were computed using
the experimental conditions, such as detector timing jit-
ter and the measured timing correlations, which were not
the same for all three test configurations. Thus, we can-
not directly compare the three curves to determine the
universally optimal alphabet size for a given loss. In-
stead, Figure 3(b) displays the secret-key rates obtained
for each alphabet size in the three test cases.
The optimal M to maximize the secret-key rate de-
pends most strongly on Bob’s received photon rate, which
is in turn a function of channel loss. If Bob had ideal de-
tectors, the highest secret-key rate would be obtained for
the fastest transmitter rate, which occurs for M = 2.
With finite detector reset times, Bob’s receivable photon
rate is limited, and in the case of detector saturation, in-
creasing M > 2 allows Alice and Bob to effectively pro-
duce secret keys even during the reset time, which can
be as long as tens or hundreds of nanoseconds. Thus, at
short distances and correspondingly low losses, we can
expect a bottleneck due to the maximum count rate of
Bob’s detectors. In this detector-limited regime, it is ad-
vantageous to increase M to encode as much information
as possible in each detected photon while keeping Bob’s
detectors just below saturation, and indeed, Figure 3(b)
demonstrates that the optimal M decreases as channel
loss increases.
The 1.2 Mbps secret-key rate over the deployed fiber is
the highest rate reported to date in a QKD field test and
also compares favorably to previously published high-rate
laboratory demonstrations under similar losses [30, 31].
Additionally, Figure 4 plots our results along with a va-
4Back-to-back 41-km spool 43-km deployed fiber
Loss (dB) 0.1 7.6 12.7
Slot duration (ps) 240 240 240
Optimal M 16 8 4
Max. secret-key rate (bps) 23× 106 5.3× 106 1.2× 106
Secure PIE (bit/photon) 1.40 0.88 0.50
TABLE I. Summary of the maximum secret-key rates obtained in the three test cases.
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FIG. 3. (a) Experimental (stars) and theoretical (dashed
curves) secret-key rates versus channel loss. Colors corre-
spond to optimal alphabet size M for each of the three test
configurations. Theoretical rates used as inputs the exper-
imental parameters of each of the test configurations. (b)
Experimental secret-key rates for all alphabet sizes of each
test case. Loss increases from left to right. The optimal M
decreases as loss increases. For experimental convenience, we
did not increase the alphabet size once it became apparent
that doing so would not increase the secret-key rate.
riety of notable QKD demonstrations [9, 18, 31–34]. Our
results show an improvement over other works for chan-
nel losses in the range of 0-15 dB. Our secret-key rate
advantage comes from both the high-dimensional QKD
protocol, which effectively generates secure information
even during the single-photon detectors’ dead time, tak-
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FIG. 4. Comparison of our P&M DO-QKD results to pre-
viously published QKD system records, chosen to repre-
sent either secure throughput or distance records for a va-
riety of protocols. BB84/T12: secure throughput record
for two-dimensional QKD [31]. HD-QKD: secure through-
put record for high-dimensional entanglement-based QKD
[9]. MDI-QKD: secure throughput record for measurement-
device-independent QKD [32]. CV/GMCS: distance record
for continuous-variable QKD [33]. BBM92: secure through-
put record for two-dimensional entanglement-based QKD [34].
COW: distance record for QKD [18].
ing advantage of what would be wasted time for tradi-
tional two-dimensional protocols, and the fast SNSPDs,
which are capable of counting up to hundreds of Mcps
[23]. Slower detectors with longer dead times would am-
plify the inherent advantage of the high-dimensional pro-
tocol, as the detectors would saturate at lower incoming
photon rates.
The high-dimensional time-energy encoding demon-
strated here offers the ability to optimize the secret-key
rate by varying the alphabet size M in response to both
channel loss and receiver limitations. This is particularly
useful when Bob’s detectors are saturated, which often
occurs over metropolitan-area distances of tens of kilo-
meters. By presenting and demonstrating a new protocol
intended to adapt to the constraints of a particular link
implementation, this work represents a new approach to
high-rate secure quantum communication optimized for
use in metropolitan areas.
5METHODS
Experimental setup
The deployed-fiber testbed comprised a pair of dark
fibers, one of which is used for quantum signals, and the
other of which is used for bright synchronization pulses.
Alice’s light source was a superluminescent diode with
tens of nanometers of optical bandwidth. This source
can enable DO-QKD with multiple spectral channels, al-
though this demonstration used only one channel with
25 GHz of optical bandwidth, filtered by a tunable band-
pass filter. The 25 GHz output was modulated by an
electro-optic modulator with a PPM sequence of 50 ps
pulses centered in 240 ps time slots that was produced
by a pulse pattern generator (PPG). The resulting optical
pulses were attenuated to either µ = 0.5 photons/pulse
for signal states or ν = 0.05 photons/pulse for decoy
states. A circulator at the output of Alice’s transmitter
(not pictured in Fig. 2) provided some protection against
a Trojan horse attack. The bright synchronization pulse
was produced by a continuous-wave laser modulated by
an electro-optic modulator driven by another output of
the same PPG. The synchronization pulse period was a
constant multiple of the symbol frame length. In the
back-to-back and spool tests, the period was 256 times
the symbol frame length for all M . For the deployed-
fiber test, the period was reduced to 64 times the symbol
frame length to mitigate the effects of timing drifts over
the installed fiber.
Because only one SNSPD system was available, Bob
could not randomly choose between the two measure-
ment bases. Therefore, we fixed both Alice and Bob’s
basis selections for the duration of each data acquisition
period. The resulting datasets were combined in postpro-
cessing. For each test case, numerical optimization of the
secret-key rate determined the probabilities with which
Alice and Bob should have selected each basis; the data
from different bases were combined using these proba-
bilities to compute the reported experimental secret-key
rates. Similarly, Alice’s choice of signal or decoy inten-
sity was fixed for the duration of each acquisition period,
the probabilities with which Alice selected signal or de-
coy states were determined by numerical optimization for
each test case, and the data from different intensities were
combined using these probabilities in postprocessing.
Secure photon information efficiency
In the asymptotic regime, the secure PIE with decoy-
state analysis is
r∞,decoy = βI(A;B)−(1−FLBµ ) log2M−FLBµ χUB(A;E),
(1)
where FLBµ is a lower bound on the fraction of Bob’s
detection events that came from a single-photon trans-
mission by Alice and χUB(A;E) is an upper bound
on Eve’s Holevo information [19, 22, 25]. Decoy state
measurements contribute to the estimation of FLBµ and
χUB(A;E). In the finite-key regime, we must consider
the effects of a finite sample size on the estimation of the
parameters related to decoy states [29], in addition to
the standard finite-size effects on parameter estimation,
error correction, and privacy amplification [28].
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